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¶1 How far do the courts have to go to protect a copyright holder’s right of distribution 
under 17 U.S.C. § 106(3), given the nature and prevalence of peer-to-peer (P2P) file 
sharing?  Under § 106 of the Copyright Act, a copyright owner has exclusive rights to 
distribute copies of his work.1  When it comes to Internet file sharing, however, 
distribution rights are far from straightforward.  Widespread distribution of copyrighted 
music occurs on the Internet, causing the recording companies to make concerted efforts 
to curb such distribution through mass litigation.  The success of these efforts depends in 
part on a critical doctrinal question that courts have not yet resolved definitively: what 
constitutes “distribution” under § 106(3) of the Copyright Act? 
¶2 A string of cases in the past ten years has turned on whether simply sharing 
copyrighted work, or making it available to others on P2P networks, without actual 
transfer of the work is enough to satisfy the distribution requirement of § 106(3) of the 
Copyright Act.2   
¶3 The debate over whether plaintiffs need to prove actual distribution arose in 
response to record companies and copyright holders who have been increasingly anxious 
about the fate of copyrighted music, as the number of people who obtain music online has 
exploded.  Recording companies began a two-pronged attack against online file sharing 
of copyrighted music.  First, recording companies filed suits alleging that P2P file sharing 
networks, like Napster3 and Grokster,4 were contributory infringers.  Second, although 
several of those suits were successful, the industry moved to filing suits against 
individuals, because new P2P networks emerged with methods of circumventing 
copyright laws.   
¶4 The Recording Industry Association of America (RIAA) has filed over 35,000 
lawsuits against individual file sharers since 2003,5 many against college students,6 
alleging that the individual file sharers have infringed on the copyright owners’ exclusive 
 
* J.D. Candidate 2011, Northwestern University School of Law.  I would like to thank my family for 
always supporting me.  I especially thank my father, Stewart Sterk, for acting as my sounding board 
throughout this process. 
1 17 U.S.C. § 106(3) (2006). 
2 See, e.g., London-Sire Records, Inc. v. Doe 1, 542 F. Supp. 2d 153 (D. Mass. 2008); Atl. Recording 
Corp. v. Anderson, No. H-06-3578, 2008 WL 2316551 (S.D. Tex. Mar. 12, 2008); Motown Record Co. v. 
DePietro, No. 04-CV-2246, 2007 WL 576284 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 16, 2007); Universal City Studios Prods. 
LLLP v. Bigwood, 441 F. Supp. 2d 185 (D. Me. 2006).   
3 A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001). 
4 Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913 (2005). 
5 Sarah McBride & Ethan Smith, Music Industry to Abandon Mass Suits, WALL ST. J., Dec. 19, 2008, at 
B1, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB122966038836021137.html#printMode. 
6 Anne Broache, RIAA Threatens 19 Universities with Lawsuits, CNET NEWS BLOG (Oct. 18, 2007, 
11:16 AM), http://news.cnet.com/8301-10784_3-9799840-7.html.  
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rights to distribute under § 106(3) by making copyrighted works available through file 
sharing.  Because it is often difficult or impossible to prove that a particular work was 
transferred from the shared folder of user A to user B, the industry stands to lose these 
suits if distribution requires such proof.  As a result, the industry has argued that user A 
distributes the work within the meaning of the statute, if user A makes the work available 
to a group of potential users.7 
¶5 Although the RIAA claims to be discontinuing its mass lawsuits against individual 
file sharers in favor of other strategies to stop illegal file sharing,8 suits are still ongoing.9  
The issue has been pushed further in the last year, with the unfolding of the only two 
cases against individual file sharers to see a jury, both of which ended in large jury 
awards for the plaintiffs.10  It is inevitable that copyright holders, if not recording 
companies, will continue to file similar suits, due to the continued prevalence of file 
sharing and the seemingly increasing potential for high rewards.  
¶6 The first part of this note will discuss the circuit split surrounding the “making 
available” issue.  It concludes that the statutory language provides little support for the 
position that making a work available constitutes distribution within the meaning of the 
statute, but notes that, as a matter of policy, requiring proof of actual transfer of files 
from one user to another undermines important copyright objectives.  Part II of this note 
will consider other alternatives to the making available and actual distribution standards 
that scholars have raised.  It explores the deficiencies in the suggestion posited by several 
scholars that secondary liability provides adequate protection for copyright owners 
against people who simply make copyrighted works available.11  Secondary liability is 
not appropriate, in theory, for dealing with file sharing, and the framework of secondary 
liability does not, in practice, provide any protection against file sharing.  Part II will also 
discuss other methods used by courts to deal with the distribution problem.  This article 
concludes that two methods can achieve protection for copyrighted recordings while not 
placing liability on people who could not have distributed files or people who were 
wholly unaware of the technological consequences of their actions.  First, courts can 
require circumstantial evidence of actual distribution.  Second, if courts interpret 
distribution to be synonymous with publication, those courts should determine if the 
intent or purpose of the defendant in sharing files was to distribute those files to other 
people.  Although both of these methods achieve a balance, it is possible that requiring 
 
7 David Kravets, MPAA Says No Proof Needed in P2P Copyright Infringement Lawsuits, WIRED.COM 
(Jun. 20, 2008, 12:24 PM), http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2008/06/mpaa-says-no-pr/. 
8 Id.  See also For Students Doing Reports, RECORDING INDUSTRY ASS’N OF AM., 
http://www.riaa.com/faq.php (last visited Apr. 17, 2011). 
9 Chad Mumm, RIAA Once Again Suing File-Sharers, SWITCHED (May 8, 2009, 8:27 AM), 
http://www.switched.com/2009/05/08/riaa-once-again-suing-file-sharers/print. 
10 See Greg Sandoval, Judge Lowers Jammie Thomas’ Piracy Penalty, CNET NEWS BLOG (Jan. 22, 
2010, 10:05 AM), http://news.cnet.com/8301-31001_3-10439636-261.html; see also Sony BMG Music 
Entm’t. v. Tenenbaum, 672 F. Supp. 2d 217 (D. Mass. 2009); Vlad Vidaeff, A $675,000 Damages Award 
for Illegal File Sharing: Joel Tenenbaum’s Ferocious Battle Against the Music Industry, N.C. BAR ASS’N 
(Feb. 28, 2011), http://intellectualpropertylaw.ncbar.org/newsletters/iplinksfeb2011/tenenbaum.aspx 
(explaining the large amount of damages awarded in Tenebaum and Judge Gertner’s opinion finding the 
amount unconstitutionally excessive). 
11 John Horsfield-Bradbury, Note, “Making Available” as Distribution: File-Sharing and the Copyright 
Act, 22 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 273, 297–99 (2008); see also Kristy Wiehe, Note, Dollars, Downloads and 
Digital Distribution: Is “Making Available” a Copyrighted Work a Violation of the Author’s Distribution 
Right?, 15 UCLA ENT. L. REV. 117, 122–23 (2008). 
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plaintiffs to prove intent may lead to too many file sharers claiming ignorance with little 
effective rebuttal opportunities for copyright holders.  Requiring circumstantial evidence 
of actual distribution, on the other hand, allows for a larger variety of evidence on both 
sides. 
I. BACKGROUND 
¶7 Since Napster entered the scene in 1999, millions of Americans have engaged in 
the sharing of copyrighted music.12  In 2004, the number of file sharers was estimated at 
around seventy million.13  Many of these file sharers are college students or younger.14  
P2P networks allow people to share copyrighted music with ease.  A person who has a 
song or video on his computer can place that file into his shared folder on his computer.  
When he places copyrighted files into the shared folder on a P2P network, third parties 
can then access the files through P2P networks and download them for their own uses.15   
¶8 File sharers have several reasons for illegally sharing and downloading music.  
Most obviously, many people want music for their own enjoyment without having to pay 
for such use.  Copyright holders, clearly, do not support this kind of use.  But not all file 
sharing may damage copyright holders.  Some people simply want to sample music 
before buying CDs or MP3s.  By downloading a version of a song from someone else’s 
shared folder, a person can hear the music in order to make a more informed subsequent 
purchase.  Others own the material in non-digital format (cassette, record, etc) and want 
to update their current collections to digital.  Also, many people would not have 
purchased the music if it were not free, so the recording companies are not losing money 
from those downloads.  In fact, many new artists find that file sharing increases their 
popularity, and, in turn, increases their music sales.16  Although it is possible that illegal 
file sharing has not hurt record sales, it is reasonable for copyright holders to fear such an 
effect.17  
¶9 Concerns about the prevalence of illegal file sharing stem from both the 
Constitution and the goal of copyright law itself.  Financial incentives may be necessary 
to assure that works continue to be produced.  Therefore, the issue is not simply about 
 
12 Ray Delgado, Law Professors Examine Ethical Controversies of Peer-to-Peer File Sharing, 
STANFORD REP. (Mar. 17, 2004), http://news-service.stanford.edu/news/2004/march17/fileshare-317.html; 
see also Seven Million ‘Use Illegal Files,’ BBC NEWS (May 28, 2009, 12:01 AM), 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/technology/8073068.stm (discussing the number of file-sharers in the U.K.). 
13 Delgado, supra note 122. 
14 See Impact of Internet Music File Sharing & CD Burning, AUSTRALIAN RECORDING INDUSTRY ASS’N 
(Jul. 16, 2003), http://www.aria.com.au/pages/CurrentIssueInternetMusicFileSharingCDBurning.htm 
(showing that a high percentage of file sharing occurs amongst people under the age of 25). 
15 See A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1011–12 (9th Cir. 2001). 
16 Shakira Hits Back at Lily Allen in Illegal Downloading Row as She Claims File Sharing ‘Brings Me 
Closer to Fans,’ MAIL ONLINE (Oct. 20, 2009, 11:10 AM), http://www.dailymail.co.uk/tvshowbiz/article-
1221639/Shakira-hits-Lily-Allen-illegal-downloading-row-claims-file-sharing-brings-closer-fans.html 
(discussing that Shakira supports illegal file sharing, and Nelly Furtado and Norah Jones are not against 
file-sharing); Robert Taylor, Piracy and Rock Music: An Investigation into Illegal Downloading Within 
Alternative Music, SUITE101 (Nov. 1, 2007), http://www.suite101.com/content/piracy-and-rock-music-
a34641; Trent Reznor and Saul Williams Discuss Their New Collaboration, Mourn OiNK, VULTURE (Oct. 
30, 2007, 6:00 PM), http://nymag.com/daily/entertainment/2007/10/trent_reznor_and_saul_williams.html. 
17 See generally Felix Oberholzer-Gee & Koleman Strumpf, The Effect of File Sharing on Record Sales: 
An Empirical Analysis, 115 J. POL. ECON. 1 (2007). 
 497
N O R T H W E S T E R N  J O U R N AL  O F  T E C H N O L O G Y  A N D  I N T E L L E C T U A L  P R O P E R TY  [ 2 0 1 1  
 
giving money to copyright holders because they feel entitled to it.  The Constitution 
provides Congress with the power to “promote the Progress of . . . useful Arts, by 
securing . . . to Authors . . . the exclusive Right to their respective Writings . . . .”18  The 
purpose behind this clause, and behind subsequent copyright laws, is to provide 
incentives for artists to create works.19  If the artists do not benefit, they will be less likely 
to want to expend the energy, time, and money necessary to create the work.  Copyright 
holders believe that file sharing removes this financial incentive.   
¶10 The question the courts have been asked to decide is whether the person who has 
copyrighted files in his shared folder is liable for copyright infringement without any 
proof that third parties have actually downloaded the files.  If so, many more people with 
shared music or video folders would be open to suits by music labels and companies, thus 
making them liable for jury awards between $750 and $30,000 for each song or video 
upon which the file sharer infringes.20 
¶11 Despite the RIAA’s claims that “there is legal clarity about what users can and 
can’t do on peer to peer networks,”21 district and appellate courts have not come to a 
consensus on whether a user who makes files available is liable for copyright 
infringement.  The large number of suits filed has not generated a large number of 
decisions.  Most of these suits are settled very early in the litigation process.22  Several 
blogs reported that the RIAA even created a website through which those accused could 
make pre-litigation payments.23  Only two lawsuits have actually made it to a jury.24  
Most of the court opinions, therefore, are in response to motions for summary judgment25 
or Rule 12(b)(6) motions for failure to state a claim.26  District courts have ruled 
inconsistently, with some refusing to dismiss, but deferring the decision of whether 
 
18 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
19 Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975) (“The immediate effect of our 
copyright law is to secure a fair return for an ‘author’s’ creative labor.  But the ultimate aim is, by this 
incentive, to stimulate artistic creativity for the general public good.”). 
20 17 U.S.C. § 504(c) (2006).  In Sony BMG Music Entertainment v. Tenenbaum, the jury awarded the 
plaintiffs $675,000, or $22,500 per song for 30 songs, see Debbie Rosenbaum, Gerter’s Ruling on 
Damages, JOEL FIGHTS BACK, http://joelfightsback.com/2010/07/gertners-ruling-on-damages/ (last visited 
Apr. 16, 2010), and in Capitol Records, Inc. v. Thomas, a jury awarded the plaintiffs $222,000 in the first 
trial and $1.9 million in the retrial.  See Sandoval, supra note 10.  Although this note will not discuss the 
issue of whether these statutory damages are excessive or unconstitutional, it is important to keep the 
implication of these damages in mind. 
21 See The IRAA, FACEBOOK (last visited Apr. 16, 2007), 
http://www.facebook.com/note.php?note_id=145043792218609 . 
22 See Jeff Leeds, Labels Win Suit Against Song Sharer, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 5, 2007, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/10/05/business/media/05music.html. 
23 See Robert J. Ambrogi, Five Years, 30,000 Lawsuits, and Counting, LEGAL BLOG WATCH (Sept. 8, 
2008, 1:52 PM), http://legalblogwatch.typepad.com/legal_blog_watch/2008/09/five-years-3000.html; Meg 
Marco, RIAA Bullies College Students with P2PLawsuits.com, THE CONSUMERIST, (Mar. 1, 2007, 10:22 
PM), http://consumerist.com/consumer/riaa/riaa-bullies-college-students-with-p2plawsuitscom-
240877.php; RIAA’s Online Settlement Receipt: Thanks for Your Money, TORRENT FREAK (May 3, 2007), 
http://torrentfreak.com/riaas-online-settlement-receipt-thanks-for-your-money/. 
24 Ashby Jones, Copy-Wrong! Unpacking the $1.92M Downloading Verdict, WALL ST. J.L. BLOG (June 
27, 2009, 10:30 AM), http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2009/06/27/copy-wrong-unpacking-the-192m-
downloading-verdict/tab/print; Ian Paul, Second RIAA Piracy Trial Starts, TECHWORLD (July 29, 2009, 
12:19 AM), http://www.techworld.com.au/article/312724/second_riaa_piracy_trial_starts/. 
25 See FED. R. CIV. P. 56. 
26 See FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6). 
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making available constitutes distribution until hearing evidence at trial,27 leaving the 
question unanswered.  
II. PART I 
¶12 This part will focus on the differing interpretations of § 106(3) of the Copyright 
Act and will argue that the making available interpretation of distribution under that Act 
is inconsistent with statutory language.  Next, it will briefly outline the court decisions on 
either side of this debate to give a framework for the two evidentiary standards employed 
by the courts in peer-to-peer cases: (1) proof of actual distribution to others and (2) proof 
of copyrighted titles in a shared folder. 
¶13 Section 106(3) states, “the owner of copyright . . . has the exclusive rights . . . to 
distribute copies or phonorecords of the copyrighted work to the public by sale or other 
transfer of ownership . . . .”28  The statute, however, does not define distribution.  Due to 
this omission, courts differ on how to interpret the word.29  Some courts and scholars 
have looked to the definition of publication, which is defined in the statute, for guidance 
on how to interpret distribution, because the definition of publication sounds almost 
identical to the language used in § 106(3) for distribution.30  Although the Fourth Circuit 
and other district courts have held that making works available is prohibited, the strength 
of the courts’ plain language arguments requiring actual distribution outweigh the policy 
concerns in favor of a making available interpretation. 
A. The Case for Making Available 
1. Statutory Definition 
¶14 Plaintiffs argue, and many courts accept, that publication and distribution are 
synonymous within the Copyright Act, because the language in the definition of 
publication is substantially similar to the language in § 106(3).  The first sentence of the 
definition of publication uses exactly the same wording as § 106(3) when it describes 
distribution:  “distribution of copies or phonorecords of a work to the public by sale or 
other transfer of ownership, or by rental, lease, or lending” constitutes publication.31  
 
27 Warner Bros. Records, Inc. v. Payne, No. W-06-CA-051, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 65765, at *11 (W.D. 
Tex. July 17, 2006) (“[T]he Court is not prepared at this stage of the proceedings to rule out the Plaintiffs’ 
‘making available’ theory as a possible ground for imposing liability.  A more detailed understanding of the 
Kazaa technology is necessary and Plaintiffs may yet bring forth evidence of actual uploading and 
downloading of files, rendering use of the ‘making available’ theory unnecessary.”); Interscope Records v. 
Duty, No. 05-CV-3744-PHX-FJM, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20214, at *6–7 nn.2–3 (D. Ariz. Apr. 14, 2006); 
see also Arista Records LLC v. Greubel, 453 F. Supp. 2d 961, 971 (N.D. Tex. 2006) (comparing the case to 
Payne and Duty in finding denying the motion to dismiss because the plaintiffs alleged that Greubel had 
“actively reproduced and/or distributed the copyrighted recordings.”). 
28 17 U.S.C. § 106(3) (2006). 
29 Compare, e.g., Atl. Recording Corp. v. Anderson, No. H-06-3578, 2008 WL 2316551, at *7 (S.D. 
Tex. Mar. 12, 2008), and Motown Record Co. v. DePietro, No. 04-CV-2246, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
11626, at *13 n.38 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 16, 2007) (finding publication and distribution synonymous), with 
London-Sire Records, Inc. v. Doe 1, 542 F. Supp. 2d 153, 168 (D. Mass. 2008), and Atl. Recording Corp. 
v. Howell, 554 F. Supp. 2d 976, 985 (D. Ariz. 2008) (finding that distribution and publication have 
different meanings). 
30 See, e.g., Atl. Recording, 2008 WL 2316551, at *7. 
31 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2006).   
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However, the definition also includes offers to distribute, stating, “The offering to 
distribute copies or phonorecords to a group of persons for purposes of further 
distribution, public performance, or public display, constitutes publication.”32  Plaintiffs 
argue that because Congress included both distribution and offering to distribute within 
the definition of publication, Congress intended distribution in § 106(3) to also include 
offering to distribute.33  Offering to distribute is the same as making works available.  
Therefore, distribution in § 106(3) contemplates that simply making works available 
should constitute infringement.   
¶15 This interpretation is bolstered by the Supreme Court’s language in Harper & Row 
Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises.34  In that case, the Court called the distribution 
right in § 106(3) the “right of first publication.”35  The Court did not go so far as to say 
that § 106(3) includes offers to distribute or that the definition of publication in § 101 is 
applicable to distribution, but other courts have created that connection.36  The Court also 
quoted the House Committee on the Judiciary, calling distribution “the exclusive right of 
publications.”37   
¶16 In Atlantic Recording Corp. v. Anderson, the District Court for the Southern 
District of Texas used the statute itself and the interchangeable use of distribution and 
publication in Harper & Row to find the words synonymous.38  In Atlantic Recording, as 
in most other P2P infringement cases, the recording company hired MediaSentry, a 
digital piracy investigator, who detected someone distributing thirty-one copyrighted 
recordings.39  MediaSentry obtained the IP address of the user’s computer, contacted the 
Internet Service Provider (ISP) for the name of that user, and subsequently filed suit 
against the user.40  The court granted summary judgment to the recording company, 
because the defendant admitted to sharing copyrighted files on Kazaa, an act that 
constituted offering to distribute, or making works available.41   
¶17 In Motown Record Co. v. DePietro, the District Court for the Eastern District of 
Pennsylvania also relied, at least in part, on the statute itself to find an exclusive making 
available right.42  In a footnote, the court cited a letter from the Register of Copyrights 
that stated, “[M]aking [a work] available for other users of [a] peer to peer network to 
download . . . constitutes an infringement of the exclusive distribution right, as well as 
the production right.”43  The court used this letter to equate publication and distribution.  
Although the court did not grant plaintiff’s request for summary judgment, the denial was 
 
32 Id. 
33 See, e.g., Atl. Recording, 2008 WL 2316551, at *7. 
34 Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539 (1985). 
35 Id. at 552. 
36 See id.  
37 Id.  See also H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 61 (1976) (calling the bundle of five rights in § 106 the 
exclusive rights of “reproduction, adaptation, publication, performance, and display”) (emphasis added). 
38 Atl. Recording, 2008 WL 2316551, at *7. 
39 Id. at *2. 
40 Id. 
41 Id. at *7–8. 
42 Motown Record Co. v. DePietro, No. 04-CV-2246, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11626, at *13 n.38 (E.D. 
Pa. Feb. 16, 2007). 
43 Id. (quoting Letter from Marybeth Peters, Register of Copyrights, to Rep. Howard L. Berman, Rep. 
from the 28th Dist. of Cal. (Sept. 25, 2002)). 
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due to the remaining question of fact as to whether the defendant had been misidentified, 
not whether whoever had shared the songs was liable.44   
2. Using Hotaling and A & M Records for Support 
¶18 Various other courts have also reached the conclusion that making available is 
barred by § 106(3) without focusing on the statutory definition of publication.  These 
courts, instead, relied on the Fourth Circuit’s holding in Hotaling v. Church of Jesus 
Christ of Latter-Day Saints45 and the Ninth Circuit’s decision in A&M Records, Inc. v. 
Napster, Inc.46   
¶19 Although Hotaling did not involve the Internet, the Fourth Circuit found that 
making unauthorized copies of genealogical material on microfiche available in a church 
library constituted infringement.47  The church owned one authorized copy, so making an 
unauthorized copy of the work they owned was permissible, as long as the unauthorized 
copy was only used as a replacement in case the original was damaged.48  The church 
was found liable for infringement, however, because it distributed the copies that it had 
created to its branch libraries and added the copyrighted works to its catalog, thereby 
making the works available to the public.49  In Hotaling, as in file sharing cases, the 
plaintiffs could not prove that anyone actually used the unauthorized works, because the 
library did not keep records of microfiche use.50  However, the court found that the 
church had “completed all the steps necessary for distribution to the public,” and 
therefore held that it had violated § 106(3).51 
¶20 Napster, on the other hand, directly involved P2P networks.  In Napster, the Ninth 
Circuit explicitly stated, “Napster users who upload file names to the search index for 
others to copy violate plaintiffs’ distribution rights.”52  Because uploading files does not 
show that a third party actually copied the files, this statement by the court seemed to 
embrace the making available standard.  In Napster, however, the court’s decision did not 
hinge on the making available theory, because the plaintiffs had established direct 
infringement.53  The district court found that Napster users were actually downloading 
the songs that others had uploaded,54 so the finding of distribution did not need to rely on 
the making available theory. 
¶21 Although neither Hotaling nor Napster involved claims against individual P2P 
network users, courts have used the language in those opinions to conclude that proof of 
actual distribution is not required in the file-sharing arena under § 106(3), but rather that 
 
44 Id. at *15–16. 
45 Hotaling v. Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints, 118 F.3d 199 (4th Cir. 1997). 
46 A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001).  The DePietro court also cites this 
decision as one of its reasons for finding an exclusive making available right. 
47 Hotaling, 118 F.3d at 204–205. 
48 Id. at 204.  Section 108(c) provides limited reproduction exemptions for libraries, including allowing 
libraries to create replacement copies.  17 U.S.C. § 108(c) (2006). 
49 Hotaling, 118 F.3d at 203. 
50 Id. 
51 Id. 
52 A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1014 (9th Cir. 2001). 
53 Napster additionally deals with the issue of secondary liability.  See id. at 1019–24. 
54 A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 114 F. Supp. 2d 896, 909–11 (N.D. Cal. 2000) aff’d in part, 
rev’d in part, 239 F.3d 1004 (9th. Cir. 2001). 
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proof of copyrighted works made available to the public is sufficient to establish 
liability.55  In Sony BMG Music Entertainment v. Doe, the District Court for the Eastern 
District of North Carolina said Hotaling constituted binding precedent and stood for the 
interpretation that distribution included “making a protected work available to the 
public.”56  The holding against the defendant was based simply on the “date on which 
defendant made copyrighted works of plaintiffs publically available, the specific works 
involved, and the [P2P network] by which they were made publically available.”57  
Additionally, in Universal City Studios Productions v. Bigwood, a case with substantially 
similar facts to Doe, the District Court for the District of Maine granted summary 
judgment to the plaintiffs, relying on both Hotaling and Napster for the conclusion that 
simply making works available on P2P networks constitutes distribution.58 
¶22 Courts on this side of the debate have not generally detailed the reasoning behind 
making available and have not discussed the statutory definition of publication.  These 
courts simply cite earlier cases like Hotaling and Napster, which also do not fully explain 
such a standard.59  In Motown Record Co. v. DePietro, for example, the court stated only 
briefly, in a footnote, the sources on which it relied with no further discussion.60  
Considering the lack of in-depth explanation of the making available doctrine in most of 
the early cases favoring the doctrine, it is not hard to imagine that courts are using their 
powers to devise a rule that may be more equitable than the statute may allow. 
B. The Case Against Making Available—Actual Distribution 
¶23 Equating distribution and publication is problematic for two reasons.  First, the 
words are different.  If Congress had wanted § 106(3) to include publication, rather than 
distribution, Congress could have done so.  Second, by distinguishing between 
distribution and offers to distribute within the definition of publication, Congress 
recognized that the two should be treated separately.  As a result, a number of courts have 
rejected making available claims in favor of a showing of actual distribution. 
¶24 In London-Sire Records, Inc. v. Doe 1, the District Court for the District of 
Massachusetts bluntly stated, “[E]ven a cursory examination of the statute suggests that 
 
55 See Sony BMG Music Entm’t v. Doe, No. 5:08-CV-109-H, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 106088, at *12–13 
(E.D.N.C. Oct. 21, 2008); Universal City Studios Prods. LLLP v. Bigwood, 441 F. Supp. 2d 185, 190–91 
(D. Me. 2006).  A few courts have acknowledged that the Hotaling decision represents a making available 
standard, but have declined to dismiss or issue summary judgment based on that standard in the pleading 
stage.  See Arista Records LLC v. Greubel, 453 F. Supp. 2d 961, 969–72 (N.D. Tex. 2006) (declining to 
dismiss because “courts have recognized that making copyrighted works available to others may constitute 
infringement by distribution in certain circumstances,” and the plaintiffs alleged that the defendant 
“actively reproduced and/or distributed the recordings”); Warner Bros. Records, Inc. v. Payne, No. W-06-
CA-051, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 65765, at *11 (W.D. Tex. Jul. 17, 2006).  The court in Arista Records, Inc. 
v. MP3Board, Inc., on the other hand, used Hotaling for the premise that plaintiffs must show actual 
dissemination, unless they can show that “proof [was] impossible to produce because the infringer [had] 
not kept records of public use,” as was the situation in Hotaling.  No. 00 Civ. 4660, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
16165, at *14 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 28, 2002). 
56 Doe, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 106088, at *12–13. 
57 Id. at *14. 
58 Bigwood, 441 F. Supp. 2d at 190–91. 
59 UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Alburger, No. 07-3705, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 91585, at *10–11 n.41 (E.D. 
Pa. Sept. 29, 2009) (citing Motown Record Co. v. DePietro, No. 04-CV-2246, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
11626, at *13 n.38 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 16, 2007)). 
60 Motown Record Co., 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11626, at *13 n.38. 
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the terms are not synonymous.”61  The court reasoned that although publication 
encompasses distribution, distribution does not include publication.62  The court also 
emphasized that Congress chose to use distribution in § 106(3), not publication, so 
plaintiffs must show that the work actually changed hands.63  Similarly, the court in 
Atlantic Recording Corp. v. Howell rejected the plaintiffs’ claim that distribution in the 
context of § 106(3) can mean either distribution or offering to distribute.64  Instead, the 
Howell court found that the plain meaning of the statute required that a work actually 
change hands and cited a wide array of authority from cases to treatises in support of its 
finding.65   
¶25 Courts also reject the making available argument based on the Eighth Circuit 
decision in National Car Rental System, Inc. v. Computer Associates International, Inc., 
which required actual distribution of copies of software for the infringement claim.66  
Like Hotaling, National Car Rental is a non-Internet case that has been applied to the 
P2P setting.  In National Car Rental, the issue was whether the Copyright Act preempted 
Computer Associates International, Inc.’s (CA) claim for breach of contract.67 National 
Car Rental System, Inc. (National Car Rental) had a licensing agreement with CA for a 
computer program, restricting National Car Rental’s use of the program to the internal 
operations of its own company.68  CA brought the suit after learning that National Car 
Rental had used the program to process data of other companies.69  In holding that the 
claim was not preempted, the court found that the Copyright Act was less restrictive on 
National Car Rental than the license agreement.  The court held that unlike the license 
agreement, “‘infringement of [the distribution right] requires an actual dissemination of 
either copies or phonorecords.’”70  The court went further to say that the Copyright Act 
does not protect the functionality of software, but “only the right to distribute copies of 
the work.”71   
¶26 Although the facts of the case are not analogous to those in the file sharing cases 
because National Car Rental did not offer to make copies of the program for the other 
companies or provide the companies with an opportunity to make copies of the program 
themselves, many courts have applied the language to file sharing.  The most publicized 
of this line of cases is Capitol Records, Inc. v. Thomas, the first P2P file sharing case to 
reach a jury.72  Although the jury found that Thomas infringed Capitol Records’ 
copyrights, the district court judge overturned the verdict because he found a jury 
 
61 London-Sire Records, Inc. v. Doe 1, 542 F. Supp. 2d 153, 168 (D. Mass. 2008). 
62 Id. at 169. 
63 Id. 
64 Atl. Recording Corp v. Howell, 554 F. Supp. 2d 976, 984–85 (D. Ariz. 2008). 
65 Id. at 985.  
66 Nat’l Car Rental Sys. v. Computer Assoc. Int’l, Inc., 991 F.2d 426 (8th Cir. 1993). 
67 The claim would be preempted by the Copyright Act, if the claimed breach of the contract “protects a 
right equivalent to one of the exclusive copyright rights.”  Id. at 430–31. 
68 Id. at 427. 
69 Id. at 428. 
70 Id. at 434 (quoting 2 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 8.11[A], at 
§ 8-124.1 (1992)). 
71 Id. at 434.  
72 Capitol Records, Inc. v. Thomas, 579 F. Supp. 2d 1210 (D. Minn. 2008).  After a jury awarded the 
plaintiffs a $222,000 verdict, the district judge issued a mistrial.  The retrial ended with a jury verdict of 
$1.92 million, which Judge Davis has recently reduced to $54,000. Sandoval, supra note 10. 
 503
N O R T H W E S T E R N  J O U R N AL  O F  T E C H N O L O G Y  A N D  I N T E L L E C T U A L  P R O P E R TY  [ 2 0 1 1  
 
instruction invalid.73  The instruction stated, “The act of making copyrighted sound 
recordings available for electronic distribution on a peer-to-peer network, without license 
from the copyright owners, violates the copyright owners' exclusive right of distribution, 
regardless of whether actual distribution has been shown.”74  Relying in part on National 
Car Rental, a binding Eighth Circuit precedent, the District Court for the District of 
Minnesota, sua sponte, found that its own instruction incorrectly stated the law, because 
the plaintiffs, indeed, needed to prove actual distribution.75  The court discussed that the 
plain language of the statute does not state that offers to distribute constitute distribution.  
Further, the court found that a dictionary definition of distribution requires a transfer of 
ownership and rejected the argument that publication and distribution are synonymous.76  
Then, after comparing National Car Rental and Hotaling, the court found National Car 
Rental more consistent with the statutory language, stating that the Hotaling court’s lack 
of analysis under § 106(3) showed that it was “guided by equitable concerns.”77  
Similarly, the courts in Doe 1 and Howell also found that National Car Rental stood for 
the holding that distribution requires actual dissemination of a copyrighted work.78 
C. Elektra Interpretations of the Distribution Right  
¶27 The court in Elektra Entertainment Group v. Barker found that the statute prohibits 
two actions: distribution and offering to distribute for the purposes of further distribution, 
performance, or display.79  Although the court rejected the making available doctrine, it 
found that distribution and publication were synonymous in the Copyright Act.80  Unlike 
proponents of the making available doctrine, however, the court “hesitate[d] in equating 
this avenue of liability with the contourless ‘make available’ right proposed by 
Plaintiff.”81   
¶28 The court paid special attention to the last portion of the publication definition: 
“offering to distribute copies . . . for purposes of further distribution, public performance, 
or public display.”82  If the offer isn’t for purposes of further distribution, then there is no 
violation of the distribution right.83  Because the plaintiffs did not allege that Barker 
shared files for the purpose of further distribution,84 the portion of the complaint alleging 
 
73 Capitol Records, 579 F. Supp. 2d at 1226–27. 
74 Id. at 1213. 
75 Id. at 1227. 
76 Id. at 1217, 1219–20. 
77 Id. at 1224–25. 
78 London-Sire Records, Inc. v. Doe 1, 542 F. Supp. 2d 153, 167 (D. Mass. 2008); Atl. Recording Corp. 
v. Howell, 554 F. Supp. 2d 976, 981 (D. Ariz. 2008). 
79 Elektra Entm’t Grp. V. Barker, 551 F. Supp. 2d 234 (S.D.N.Y. 2008). 
80 Id. at 240–43.  The court found the words synonymous due to several House committee reports stating 
that § 106(3) provided the exclusive right of publications and listing publication within the bundle of five 
rights provided by the statute, the decision in Harper & Row Publishers, and decisions of several other 
courts.  At the same time, the court rejected the argument that the letter from Marybeth Peters, the Register 
of Copyrights, which said the two words were synonymous should be given any weight.  Id. at 242 n.7.  
The court also rejected Hotaling’s holding that making available constitutes distribution as “not grounded 
in the statute” and simply “motivated by equitable principles.”  Id. at 243. 
81 Id. 
82 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2006) (emphasis added); Elektra, 551 F. Supp. 2d at 244–45 
83 Id. 
84 Id. at 245. 
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infringement due to defendant’s making available files failed to state a claim.85  Elektra 
Entertainment hired investigators who found that the defendant was sharing 611 files on 
Kazaa, some of which the plaintiff claimed to have copyright ownership. 
¶29 Unlike other courts, the Elektra court rejected the making available argument 
despite finding distribution and publication synonymous.86  Because it found the two 
words synonymous, the court held that the entire definition of publication must apply.87  
Publication includes not simply offering to distribute, but offering to distribute for the 
purposes of further distribution.88  Although the court partially dismissed the complaint, 
with respect to Elektra’s making available claim, because Elektra Entertainment had not 
shown that Barker had purposes of further distribution,89 the court did not discuss what a 
plaintiff needs to prove in order to show purposes of further distribution.  It is possible 
that courts could develop this requirement into a standard that balances the concerns of 
the RIAA and uninformed file sharers.  Part II will further discuss the possible 
implications of the Elektra decision. 
D. Policy Arguments 
¶30 The Internet is flooded with websites, articles, and blogs denouncing the RIAA and 
its litigation craze.90  Scholars also strongly criticize the RIAA and the making available 
interpretation.91  Many argue that using a making available standard unfairly penalizes 
people with little awareness of the workings of the Internet and their computers.92  
Copyright holders have tried to rely on screen shots showing the list of files that a 
particular user is sharing, but these screen shots do not show which of the shared files 
have been distributed to other users.  Without showing that someone actually copied 
shared files, actual distribution is uncertain, and therefore courts should not deem the 
files distributed.   
¶31 Although, the RIAA, through its mass lawsuits, has garnered a reputation of being 
a bully and has put file sharers like Jammie Thomas in the sympathy limelight, the ability 
for copyright holders to protect their creations remains important.  As P2P networks 
 
85 Id. at 244–45.  The complaint was not completely dismissed because the plaintiff also alleged that 
Barker had downloaded copyrighted files from others on Kazaa, thereby violating the plaintiff’s exclusive 
reproduction right.  Id. at 247. 
86 Id. at 244. 
87 Id. 
88 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2006). 
89 Elektra, 551 F. Supp. 2d at 245. 
90 See, e.g., Our Mission, BOYCOTT-RIAA.COM, http://www.boycott-riaa.com/mission (last visited Apr. 
16, 2011); Mike Masnick, Oh Look... RIAA Still Filing Lawsuits..., TECH DIRT (Mar. 6, 2009, 3:14 AM), 
http://www.techdirt.com/articles/20090305/2316484014.shtml; Outrageous Lawsuits, RIAA Sued Small 
Children and People with Cancer, STOP RIAA LAWSUITS, http://www.stopriaalawsuits.com/lawsuit.html 
(last visited Apr. 16, 2011). 
91 See Shana Dines, Note, Actual Interpretation Yields “Actual Dissemination”: An Analysis of the 
“Make Available” Theory Argued in Peer-to-Peer File Sharing Lawsuits, and Why Courts Ought to Reject 
It, 32 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 157, 158 (2009) (commenting on the “reign of terrorizing lawsuits 
against peer-to-peer file sharers using P2P programs”); Horsfield-Bradbury, supra note 11, at 299 (stating, 
“Courts should not be swept up in the RIAA's legal wrangling as it twists the text of the statute to meet its 
needs” and describing the making available doctrine as “nonsensical”); see generally Jonathan R.H. Law, 
“Making Available”: When an Offer to Distribute is Equivalent to Distribution (Dec. 9, 2008) (unpublished 
article), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1305599. 
92 See, e.g., Horsfield-Bradbury, supra note 11, at 275. 
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continue to grow, and new technologies for file sharing emerge, if courts do not find a 
way to hold infringers liable, there will be no way to protect the works of copyright 
holders.  Several articles suggest market methods to help solve this problem.93  While 
those methods may be effective, the goal of copyright laws is to protect copyright holders 
without placing all of the burdens of protection on the copyright holders themselves.   
¶32 Copyright holders argue that the statute provides little to no protection if it requires 
them to show actual distribution.94  Proof of actual dissemination is nearly impossible to 
attain.95  Programs like Kazaa and Napster do not keep track of which shared files have 
been copied.  In addition, the prevalence of BitTorrent sites, which allow users to 
download pieces of the same file directly from multiple different users, as opposed to a 
central server, means that one person’s shared file may not ever be copied as a whole.96  
Recording companies have hired investigators to download copyrighted files from these 
lists themselves,97 but courts are not necessarily willing to view these as unauthorized 
downloads, since the companies have, in fact, authorized the downloads.98  Copyright 
holders continue to argue that these measures should be sufficient to impose liability.   
¶33 If more evidence is required, then file sharers will rarely be found liable and will be 
able to share copyrighted material with little restriction.  Without technology advances 
that allow third parties, like the recording companies, to see whether a file has been 
downloaded and by whom, evidence of actual distribution will remain elusive.  In the 
face of such a dearth of evidence, forcing recording companies to prove actual 
distribution could provide a windfall to file sharers at the expense of copyright holders.  
On the other hand, allowing recording companies to show mere making available of 
works through a screenshot of a person’s list of shared files may give the recording 
companies an unfair advantage and may penalize people who knew that their shared 
works were either protected or corrupted and, therefore, could not be copied.  
¶34 Assuming that the statute does not support the making available doctrine, recording 
companies and courts must search for other methods of holding file sharers liable for 
infringement in order to protect the goal of copyright law—providing incentives for 
artists to produce works.   
 
93 E.g., Joel C. Boehm, Note, Copyright Reform for the Digital Era: Protecting the Future of Recorded 
Music Through Compulsory Licensing and Proper Judicial Analysis, 10 TEX. REV. ENT. & SPORTS L. 169, 
192–200 (2009). 
94 Jacqui Cheng, MPAA: Actual P2P Distribution Often “Impossible” to Prove, ARS TECHNICA (June 
23, 2008, 11:50 AM), http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/news/2008/06/mpaa-actual-p2p-distribution-often-
impossible-to-prove.ars. 
95 See Robert Kasunic, Making Circumstantial Proof of Distribution Available, 18 FORDHAM INTELL. 
PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 1145, 1152 (2008). 
96 See Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc. v. Fung, No. CV 06-5578 SVW, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 122661, at 
*7–8 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 21, 2009). 
97 E.g., UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Alburger, No. 07-3705, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 91585, at *3–4 (E.D. 
Pa. Sept. 29, 2009) (discussing how plaintiffs hired third party investigators, MediaSentry, to detect 
possible copyright violations and download files in shared folders to determine whether they were audio 
files). 
98 See London-Sire Records, Inc. v. Doe 1, 542 F. Supp. 2d 153, 166 (D. Mass. 2008). 
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III. PART II: HOW DO WE DEAL WITH THE PROBLEM OF DISTRIBUTION? 
¶35 Although copyright holders and recording companies may be able to determine out 
of court strategies to deal with the problems that P2P file sharing may cause,99 they 
should be able to appeal to the courts to protect their property.  In order to adequately 
deal with copyright holders’ suits, the courts need a unified approach that is consistent 
with the language of the statute.  This section evaluates the feasibility of paths that courts 
could follow in order to deal with the problem of distribution. 
A. Secondary Liability 
¶36 Several scholars have suggested using secondary liability to punish file sharers who 
make works available via P2P networks.100  This part will first discuss whether using 
secondary liability is practically feasible.  
¶37 Even if we accept that there may be theoretical reasons to adopt a secondary 
liability framework for people who make copyrighted works available on P2P 
networks,101 the feasibility of such a framework in these cases is difficult.  Secondary 
liability has two forms: contributory and vicarious.102  Contributory infringement is when 
a person induces or materially contributes to the infringing conduct of another person and 
has reason to know of the infringement.103  Vicarious infringement is found when a 
person “profit[s] from direct infringement while declining to exercise a right to stop or 
limit it.”104  For individual file sharers, only contributory liability would be an option, as 
individuals do not profit from others copying their files.   
¶38 The problem with fitting file sharers into a contributory liability framework is that 
proof of direct infringement is a prerequisite for contributory (and vicarious) liability.105  
Plaintiffs would have to prove that a third party copied the defendant’s files in order to 
impose contributory liability.  Proving direct infringement, or copying by a third party, 
seems to raise the same problems that led to the making available debate.  The plaintiffs 
will encounter the same evidentiary drought in showing that a third party copied files 
 
99 One example of a possible strategy is creating licensing agreements with Internet service providers. 
See Matthew Hofmeister, The RIAA and Online Piracy: Why Bundling Access to Digital Music With Other 
Products and Services Would Give the Industry Greater Control Over Downloading, 28 ENT. & SPORTS 
LAW. 1, 32 (2010). 
100 See, e.g., 4 WILLIAM F. PATRY, PATRY ON COPYRIGHT § 13:11.50 (2009); William Henslee, Money 
for Nothing and Music for Free? Why the RIAA Should Continue to Sue Illegal File-Sharers, 9 J. 
MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 1, 17 (2009); Horsfield-Bradbury, supra note 11, at 299; Kasunic, supra 
note 95, at 1163. 
101 William Patry argues that putting files in a shared folder, even if it is clear that others downloaded 
those files, does not constitute distribution because it is not active “giving” and that contributory liability 
would be more fitting. 4 WILLIAM F. PATRY, PATRY ON COPYRIGHT § 13:11.50.  See also Horsfield-
Bradbury, supra note 11, at 299.  Patry’s theory is flawed, however, because a person who shares a 
copyrighted file through a P2P network and tells his friend to download that file seems no less liable for 
infringement than the person who sent a copy of the file through email.  The ease of online transfers, as 
opposed to other modes of copying, should not create a different standard for liability.  See David O. 
Carson, Making the Making Available Right Available, 33 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 135, 137–38 (2010). 
102 See Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 929–30 (2005). 
103 3-12 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 12.04 (2009). 
104 Grokster, 545 U.S. at 930. 
105 A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1013 n.2 (9th Cir. 2001). 
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from a given individual’s shared folder as they have when attempting to prove 
distribution under § 106(3). 
¶39 In the secondary liability cases involving P2P networks, direct infringement has 
been shown by evidence that users of the networks, as a whole, copied and distributed 
copyrighted works.106  The evidence of users’ copying copyrighted works through P2P 
networks is so extensive that P2P networks have admitted to such violations of 
reproduction and distribution rights.107  The known widespread direct infringement 
(copying) eliminated the need for plaintiffs to show any specific instances of such 
infringement.   
¶40 In the case of individual defendants, however, the question is narrower.  The only 
direct infringement that is relevant to an individual file sharer’s liability is third party 
copying of the individual’s own files, rather than the general copying that takes place on 
the P2P network.  The Supreme Court said a contributory infringer is someone “in a 
position to control the use of copyrighted works by others and [has] authorized the use 
without permission from the copyright owner.”108  The only copyrighted works that an 
individual user can possibly control on P2P networks are those on his own computer.  If 
proof of a third party copying a defendant’s files from the user is required, as it seems to 
be, then we reach the same problems that the RIAA encountered in direct liability 
cases—the same problems that led to the making available doctrine.  Proof of specific 
acts of copying is difficult, if not impossible, to obtain.   
¶41 Courts could take the stance that infringement is so widespread, and, therefore, if a 
person is merely sharing a copyrighted file, someone must have copied it.  However, this 
again, brings us back to making assumptions that are disputed in the current debate.  If 
we assume that proof of illegal copying on the P2P network as a whole is enough to 
satisfy a showing of direct infringement, however, it may still be difficult to show that 
file sharers: a) have knowledge that another person copied his files; and b) substantially 
contribute to or intentionally induce infringement on the network as a whole.  First, it 
would be a hard case to show that file sharers intentionally induce such infringement 
because, unlike P2P networks, individuals have no profit motive, such as selling 
adverting space, to induce infringement.109  Second, although showing substantial 
contribution to the infringement may not be difficult, it would be difficult to show that 
the file sharer had knowledge that other people were copying his specific files.  If 
plaintiffs cannot prove that another person copied the file sharer’s files, then plaintiffs 
likely would not have an effective way to show that the file sharer knew whether others 
were copying his files. 
 
106 A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 114 F. Supp. 2d 896, 911 (N.D. Cal. 2000) (holding that the 
“[p]laintiffs have established a prima facie case of direct copyright infringement” because “virtually all 
Napster users engage in the unauthorized downloading or uploading of copyrighted music; as much as 
eighty-seven percent of the files available on Napster may be copyrighted”), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 239 
F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001). 
107 E.g., Grokster, 545 U.S. at 923. 
108 Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 437 (1984). 
109 Grokster, 545 U.S. at 936, 40.  An individual may reap benefits from other users uploading copyright 
works (putting files on the network), because the individual would then have easy access to these works if 
he wanted to engage in illegal copying.  The question for contributory liability, however, is not whether an 
individual induced uploading, but whether he induced downloading of copyrighted music. 
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¶42 Secondary liability, therefore, is unlikely to be helpful in finding a way to hold 
infringers liable without running into the same issues of proof of actual distribution for 
primary liability, as outlined in Part I.  The only argument in favor of using secondary 
liability is that if a low standard is used, at least the damages awarded against the 
defendant may not be as great as under primary liability.110  Using a making available 
standard to prove distribution in contributory liability may seem fair if the damages are 
not as harsh.  Despite this weak equitable consideration, using a making available 
standard in the contributory liability realm, and not for primary liability, would likely 
create more problems and questions than it answers.  
B. Deemed Distribution and Circumstantial Evidence 
¶43 Requiring circumstantial evidence of file transfers to prove distribution is another 
approach that some courts have taken in P2P file sharing cases.  The evidentiary 
standards that these courts require, however, differ drastically.  While courts using a 
deemed distribution standard require little, if any, more than evidence of copyrighted files 
in a shared folder in order to infer distribution, other courts would require more, and 
allow defendants to present evidence leaning against distribution.   
¶44 Several courts have interpreted Hotaling to represent a concept of deemed 
distribution.111  In London-Sire Records, Inc. v. Doe 1, the court explained that deemed 
distribution explicitly allows the fact finder to draw an inference that distribution 
occurred “where the defendant has completed all the necessary steps for a public 
distribution.”112  The Ninth Circuit, in Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., discussed 
that this deemed distribution doctrine did not apply to Google as it had applied in 
Hotaling and Napster, because Google did not own copies of the infringing images 
involved in the dispute.113   
¶45 The deemed distribution doctrine contrasts from the making available doctrine 
because it acknowledges that actual distribution is required by the statute and simply 
chooses a low standard of circumstantial evidence—a standard that only requires a 
showing that copyrighted files were in a shared folder on a P2P network.  In practice, 
however, the deemed distribution doctrine does not look different from the making 
available doctrine.  The low evidentiary standard presents the same undesirable 
consequences as the making available doctrine—liability for some people who could not 
have distributed files, despite the files sitting in a shared folder.  
 
110 17 U.S.C. § 504 allows for statutory damages of up to $150,000 per infringed work/song, but does 
not discuss application to secondary infringers as opposed to direct infringers.  It may be possible, 
therefore, for courts to interpret statutory damages to only apply to direct infringers.  See Symposium, 21st 
Century Copyright Law in the Digital Domain, 13 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 247, 275–76 (2006); 
Stephanie Berg, Remedying the Statutory Damages Remedy for Secondary Copyright Infringement 
Liability: Balancing Copyright and Innovation in the Digital Age, 56 J. COPYRIGHT SOC'Y U.S.A. 265, 303–
04 (2009) (discussing how statutory damages for secondary infringement deters innovations, but also 
noting that the legislative history of the Digital Theft Act of 1999 contained “no mention of how such 
statutory damages would apply to those held liable for secondary copyright infringement”).  This is an issue 
on which courts have not yet ruled. 
111 E.g., Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 508 F.3d 1146, 1162 (9th Cir. 2007). 
112 London-Sire Records, Inc. v. Doe 1, 542 F. Supp. 2d 153, 169 (D. Mass. 2008). 
113 Perfect 10, 508 F.3d at 1162–63. 
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¶46 The court in Capitol Records, Inc. v. Thomas, on the other hand, ventured further 
away from the making available doctrine when it said, “Plaintiffs are free to employ 
circumstantial evidence to attempt to prove actual dissemination.”114  Several scholars 
have also discussed this alternative to more definite proof of distribution.115  
Circumstantial evidence should be required because screenshots, alone, of the files a 
person is sharing (the only evidence required by making available courts) can be 
misleading.  For example, shared files may not be able to be copied or may not actually 
be copyrighted.  It is possible that the name of a file is not what is actually contained 
within it,116 a low bandwidth setting will not allow downloads,117 or a file is corrupted, 
making it unusable.118  In fact, many record companies (and iTunes), at some point, used 
Digital Rights Management (DRM) technology that prevents copying of files;119 so, even 
if those DRM-protected files were listed in a shared folder, they could not actually be 
copied.  These obstacles to actual distribution make it difficult to know not only whether 
a work has been copied, but also whether a work is even capable of being copied.  
Requiring circumstantial evidence to rule out some of these possibilities would create 
more of a balance between copyright holders and file sharers. 
¶47 Although using circumstantial evidence to prove a fact is not a novel idea,120 courts 
have not discussed its use much in regards to file sharing.  If circumstantial evidence 
were used to prove actual dissemination, judges and juries could look to a number of 
factors, including (1) how long the files had been shared, (2) the bandwidth settings on 
the computer, (3) the amount of activity on the P2P network used by the defendant, (4) 
the quality of the actual files allegedly copied, amongst other relevant data.  Relying 
more heavily on circumstantial evidence would also give the defendants more of a chance 
to rebut the presumption against them caused by the plaintiffs showing the lists of shared, 
copyrighted files.  Although the circumstantial evidence may not conclusively prove that 
the files were actually copied by other users, requiring such evidence would help to reach 
a better balance than the making available doctrine, which seems to require no proof 
other than a screenshot of song listings.121   
 
114 Capitol Records, Inc. v. Thomas, 579 F. Supp. 2d 1210, 1225 (D. Minn. 2008). 
115 E.g., Kasunic, supra note 95; Boehm, supra note 93, at 185–187. 
116 See Nicolas Christin et al., Content Availability, Pollution and Poisoning in File Sharing Peer-to-
Peer Networks, 2005 PROCEEDINGS OF THE 6TH ACM CONFERENCE ON ELECTRONIC COMMERCE 68 
(describing how people can poison the P2P networks by purposely introducing decoy files with the name 
and information of copyrighted works, but with “actual content [that] is unreadable, corrupted, or altogether 
different from what the user expects”); Andrew Orlowski, “I Poisoned P2P Networks for the RIAA”—
Whistleblower, THE REGISTER (Jan. 17, 2003, 1:01 PM), 
http://www.theregister.co.uk/2003/01/17/i_poisoned_p2p_networks/. 
117 Disabling File Sharing, MONTCLAIR STATE U., http://oit.montclair.edu/resnet/disable.html (last 
visited Mar. 1, 2011) (giving directions for setting bandwidth to zero in order to disallow downloads of 
shared files). 
118 See Chadwick Schnee, Note, A ‘Sound’ Policy? The RIAA and the Copyright Act, 9 U. PITT. J. TECH. 
L. & POL'Y 1, 20–21 (2009), http://tlp.law.pitt.edu/wp-content/uploads/2009/10/SchneeVolX.pdf; Christin, 
Weigend & Chuang, supra note 1166. 
119 Julia Layton, How Digital Rights Management Works, 
http://computer.howstuffworks.com/drm1.htm/printable (last visited Mar. 1, 2011). 
120 See, e.g., Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464, 468–69 (2d Cir. 1946). 
121 A suggestion to use presumptions against defendants in file sharing suits, see generally Joe 
Weissman, Note, Distribution, I Presume: A Role for Presumptions in Establishing the “Making 
Available” Right, 27 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 737 (2010), is similar to this circumstantial evidence 
approach.  Under the presumption approach, the courts would assume that copyrighted works in shared 
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C. The Elektra Method 
¶48 As discussed in Part I, the Elektra court accepted the premise that distribution and 
publication are synonymous, but did not accept that the definition of publication provided 
a making available right.122  The court elaborated that the plaintiffs had to show that 
when the defendant offered to distribute (or made works available on a P2P network), she 
made the works available “for the purpose of further distribution.”123  The court, 
however, did not discuss how a plaintiff would show such a purpose.  Seizing upon the 
Barker court’s reasoning, other courts may have an opportunity to devise an equitable 
solution to the making available debate that balances the interests of the RIAA and file 
sharers.  By creating a standard for the purpose of further distribution that accounts for 
the intent of the file sharer, courts could dismiss claims against defendants who had no 
knowledge of the technology, those who accidentally shared files, and others who are 
similarly situated.  It is this group of people that generates the most public outrage when 
sued by the RIAA.124  By requiring record companies to at least prove intent when they 
are unable to prove actual dissemination, courts could protect “innocent” file sharers 
from liability while still punishing those who are aware of their actions.125  In order to 
make out a prima facie case, the plaintiff would have to either establish proof of intent of 
further distribution or actual transfer of ownership.   
¶49 The court in Atlantic Recording Corp. v. Anderson already missed an opportunity 
to use this standard, however, in its decision granting plaintiffs’ motion for summary 
judgment.  The Anderson court found that making a copyrighted work available on a P2P 
network constitutes an offer to distribute and that “making copyrighted works available 
for download via a peer-to-peer network contemplates ‘further distribution,’ and thus 
constitutes a violation of the copyright owner’s exclusive ‘distribution’ right under 17 
U.S.C. § 106(3).”126  The Anderson court and other courts that want plaintiffs to be able 
to win these infringement cases could easily link sharing files to further distribution, 
because that often is the purpose of file sharing.127  However, as with using the making 
available doctrine, the court assumed too much when it said that every person who shares 
files contemplates further distribution.   
¶50 Despite the holding in Anderson, courts still have an opportunity to use the 
definition of publication to create a standard that may prove to be more equitable than 
 
folders had been distributed, but the defendants could present evidence to disprove distribution.  Id. at 747.  
The presumption approach, however, places a lighter initial burden on the copyright holders, requiring 
them, at least initially, to show nothing more than the making available of works and places a heavier 
burden on users.   
122 Elektra Entm’t Grp., Inc. v. Barker, 551 F. Supp. 2d 234, 240–41 (S.D.N.Y. 2008). 
123 Id. at 244. 
124 See Horsfield-Bradbury, supra note 11 at 296; Justin Ryan, RIAA Preys on Teen in Need of 
Transplant, LINUX J. (Dec. 9, 2008), http://www.linuxjournal.com/content/riaa-preys-teen-need-transplant. 
125 Although some people think the results and jury awards in Thomas and Tenenbaum also seem 
inequitable, both defendants appear to have willingly infringed the copyrights of the plaintiffs and should 
not be completely absolved of liability just because file-sharing is prevalent.  The question of appropriate 
damages is separate question. 
126 Atl. Recording Corp. v. Anderson, No. H-06-3578, 2008 WL 2316551, at *7 (S.D. Tex. Mar. 12, 
2008). 
127 See Boehm, supra note 93, at 184 (discussing how if the goal is to allow plaintiffs to win, courts will 
allow an inference that file sharing promotes further distribution due to the nature of the networks or import 
a different broad meaning). 
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either requiring proof of actual dissemination or allowing the making available of works 
to constitute infringement. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
¶51 Neither the making available doctrine, nor requiring proof of actual dissemination 
reach an optimum balance between the rights of copyright holders and the file sharers 
who may actually be innocent of infringement.  Courts, therefore, should either adopt the 
reasoning of Elektra and then require some form of intent to show a purpose of further 
distribution or should require a showing of actual distribution, but with the caveat that 
circumstantial evidence can be sufficient to show such distribution. 
